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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND 
ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP. AND 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
CORRECTED APPELLANTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Suit by architect for additional fees claimed to be 
owed for extra architectural services and expenses re-
sulting from changes ordered by Defendants in the 
design and construction of the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice complex. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Court granted summary judgment dismissing Plain-
tiffs claims. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of summary judgment of dismissal and 
remand for trial on the merits. 
Case No. 
13610 
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^ STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County employed 
Beecher (plaintiff) as architect for the Metropolitan 
Hall of Justice Complex (R. 27 & 36), appointed the 
Salt Lake City Engineer as their representative and 
required that Beecher ". . . perform and conduct all 
required services under his direction and supervision 
. . ." (R. 32, Par. 13). Under the direction and super-
vision of the City Engineer Beecher for approximately 
10 months prepared schematic and preliminary studies 
on the design of a proposed single high-rise building 
and had earned a fee to that point of about $120,000.00 
(R. 286) when the Defendant (acting through a citi-
zens' advisory committee) decided not to build a high-
rise, to change the basic concept for the project (R. 
286-289) and to start over. Beecher, who had been 
paid nothing to that point, was coerced by economic 
duress (in view of the large amount expended by 
Beecher on plans which were scrapped) into accepting 
a partial payment of $36,000.00 as a part of the total fee 
that Defendant had contracted to pay for the project. 
(R. 34, 45, 229, par. 11, 286, 293 and 298) 
Construction time for the originally contemplated 
high-rise and also for the yet to be designed revised pro-
ject was estimated at 730 calendar days (R. 49-50, 288, 
289). After said abandonment of the original project 
and partial payment of architectural fees, Defendants 
decided to build the revised project in two phases and 
to defer construction of the Court Building portion until 
the first phase was completed so as to permit use of 
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the police building until the new police facilities were 
completed. This two-phase program resulted in actual 
construction time of 1736 days (R. 299), (approximately 
2y2 times the 730 days contemplated by the parties when 
they entered into the original and supplemental agree-
ments) (R. 27 and 36). 
The architect was required under the terms of the 
agreement to provide services during the entire con-
struction period, and his claims result from the addi-
tional construction time and from changes ordered by 
the Defendants. The agreement included the following 
provision: (Portion of Paragraph #4 of Agreement) 
"EXTRA SERVICES AND SPECIAL CASES. 
If the Architect is caused extra drafting or other 
expenses due to changes ordered by the Owner, . . . 
he shall be equitably paid for such extra expense 
and the service involved . . " (R. 29, 4). 
Plaintiff's claims, which were dismissed by the 
Court, are for extra drafting and expenses resulting 
from changes ordered by the Defendants (Owners) 
within the meaning of said contractural provision, and 
are basically as follows: 
Item #1 . (R. 47, 60-61) Claim for attending 
approximately 75 meetings with Citizens' Advisory 
Committee (contract named City Engineer as rep-
resentative of Defendants [R. 32, par. 13] and re-
quiring Plaintiff to attend said meetings constitutes 
extra work not contemplated by the contract [See 
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also explanation in Plaintiff's answer to Defen-
dant's interrogatories]) (R. 238-240, par. # 2 ) . 
Item #2. (R. 38 & 61). Claim for extra work 
resulting from preparation of new drawings to 
replace those abandoned by Defendants when De-
fendants changed the type of facility desired (after 
Plaintiff had worked for 10 months under the di-
rection of Defendants' representative on the origin-
ally contemplated project.) (See also explanation 
in Plaintiff's answers to interrogatories — R. 229-
230, Par. 1 & 12). The agreement provides in part 
as follows: (R. 29, Par. #4) (Portion of Paragraph 
# 4 of Agreement) 
"If any work designed or specified by the 
Architect is abandoned or suspended, in whole 
or in part, the Architect is to be paid for the 
service rendered on account of it." 
See also contractural provision for payment to 
Architect for extra work and expenses quoted on 
page 3 above and found at (R. 29 & 47). 
Item # 3. Not involved in appeal. 
Item #4. (R. 50 & 64-68) Claim for extra 
drafting and other expenses resulting from the 
later decision to build the project in two phases 
extended the construction period from the origin-
ally contemplated 730 days (R. 243, Par. 8, 267) to 
actual construction time of 1736 days. That decision 
to extend construction period was made well after 
execution of the supplemental agreements. (R. 36 
and 45, 245, Par. 8 (j) , 269.) (Accordingly plaintiffs 
claim could not have been waived by the supple-
mental agreement.) 
Item #5 . Not involved in appeal. 
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Item #6. (R. 53 & 68) Claim for extra work 
in connection with assisting in the defense of a 
taxpayer's lawsuit filed against Defendants herein 
in connection with awarding of bid for jail equip-
ment contract. (See also R. 231, Par. 24, R. 239, Par. 
2( f ) ) . 
Items # 7 and 8. (R. 53-54, 89). Claims for space 
analysis survey and square foot analysis to deter-
mine space requirements to Defendants in connec-
tion with size of structure to be constructed and to 
determine portion of completed space occupied by 
each of the Defendants. This work was extra work 
not included in the contract between the parties. 
Defendants acknowledged that they were indebted 
to plaintiff for those services (R. 89-90, Par. 7 & 8) 
(The Court overlooked that admission of liability 
and improperly dismissed those claims). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL. 
Since disputed issues of fact exist which, if re-
solved in favor of Plaintiff, would entitle Plaintiff to 
recover against Defendants, the granting of summary 
judgment in this matter was improper. Summary judg-
ment should be vacated and the case remanded for 
trial on the merits. DAV v. Hendrixson, 9 U. (2d) 152, 
340 P.2d 416; Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance Co., 20 U. 
(2d) 156, 434 P. 2d 758. 
The agreement between Plaintiff and the Defendants 
specified no time for construction of the project to be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
designed by Plaintiff (R. 27, 36 and 45), however, the 
sworn answers to interrogatories filed by Plaintiff indi-
cate that at the time of execution of the agreements the 
parties contemplated building a structure requiring a 
period of not to exceed two years (730 days) to con-
struct. (R. 243, Par. 8). As a result of the later change to 
a two-phase project the actual construction time was 
1736 days (R. 50 & 64), an increase of 1006 days. The 
bulk of Plaintiff's claims relate to extra work performed 
and extra expenses incurred by Plaintiff in performing 
professional services during the additional 1006 days 
construction period. The Court ruled that Plaintiff's 
claims were waived by the supplemental agreements 
(R. 34 & 45). The Court erred in that determination. 
The following issues of fact exist which are in dispute 
and require testimony and evidence at a trial, thereby 
precluding the granting of summary judgment: 
1. UNDISPUTED CLAIMS IMPROPERLY DISMISSED. 
Plaintiff's claim (items #7 and 8) for extra com-
pensation for space analysis and square foot analysis 
(R. 53-54, 69) (see page 5 above) are not disputed 
by Defendants who have acknowledged liability there-
for. See letter of Feb. 4, 1970, (R, 89-90, par. 7 and 8) 
wherein Jack L. Crellin, City Attorney, recommends to 
the Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County Commissions 
that those claims be allowed. The Court odviosuly over-
looked Defendants' admission of liability in granting 
summary judgment dismissing those claims. If Defen-
dants now dispute items #7 and 8 then an issue of fact 
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exists which requires a trial to determine whether or 
not Plaintiff is entitled to be paid for that extra 
work. The record is wholly devoid of any affidavits, 
admissions, pleadings, etc. which would justify sum-
mary judgment of dismissal, particularly in view of rule 
concerning summary judgments to the effect that for 
purposes of such a motion plaintiff is entitled to have the 
court survey the evidence and all reasonable reference 
fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to Plaintiff. Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 U. (2d) 
30, 395 P.2d 62. 
2. TWO-PHASE CONSTRUCTION DECISION CONSTI-
TUTES A CHANGE ORDERED BY THE OWNERS. 
Since the later decision by the Defendants to con-
struct the project in two parts or phases was made well 
after the parties entered into the supplemental agree-
ments (R. 34 and 45), execution of those agreements 
could not constitute a waiver by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has 
a right to recover additional compensation, under the 
terms of the agreement, for extra services furnished 
at the request of the Defendants. If Defendants dispute 
the fact that the decision to build in two phases was 
made after the execution of the supplemental agree-
ments, then an issue of fact remains to be tried with 
respect to when the project was changed from a single 
phase project to a two-phase project. See also discussion 
on page 6 above and R. 50 & 64, paragraphs #4; Plain-
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tiff's answers to interrogatories, (R. 243, Par. 8); also see 
discussion in memorandum to the Court, * R. 263-278. 
Issues of fact remain for trial as to whether or not after 
the parties had entered into the agreements employing 
Plaintiff, including the supplemental agreements, the 
Defendants changed the project from one which con-
templated a construction period of 730 days to one re-
quiring a construction period of 1,736 days, and whether 
or not said change by the defendants constituted extra 
work for which Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated 
within the meanings of paragraphs # 4 and 7 of the 
agreement between the parties (R. 29, Par. #4; R. 30, 
Par. #7. See page 13 hereof). The agreement between 
the parties is silent as to the time contemplated for con-
struction of the project and accordingly is ambiguous in 
that regard so parole evidence is admissable to establish 
the intent of the parties as to the contemplated construc-
tion period for the project. Continental Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Bybee, 6 U. (2d) 98, 306 P.2d 773; Spite v. Brickhouse, 
123 NE 2d 117, 49 ALR2d 673; Hite v. Aydlett, 132 SE 149; 
Svarz v. Dunlap, 235 P. 801, 271 P. 893; Stacy-Judd v. 
Stone, 12 P2d 143; Mitterhausen v. S. Wise. Conf. Asso., 14 
NW 2d 19; Parsons v. Brvston Dev. Co., 402 P. 2d 839; 5 
Am Jur 2d Architects Sec. 19, P. 682 and cases there 
cited. There is probably no better evidence of the inten-
tion of the parties to build a single bulding of one-phase 
construction than the fact that Beecher, under the direc-
tion of the agent for the Defendants, worked for 10 
months on a single phase building project (R. 229 & 230). 
See Trucker Sales Corp. v. Potter, 104 U. 1,137 P. 2d 370. 
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3. SERVICES IN TAXPAYER'S LAWSUIT ARE EXTRA 
SERVICES. 
Issues of fact remain for trial as to whether Plain-
tiff is entitled to recover for additional services fur-
nished by Plaintiff at the request of Defendant in con-
nection with a lawsuit filed against Defendants by a 
taxpayer contesting the awarding of the jail equipment 
Contract, and whether or not those services were includ-
ed in the duties of Plaintiff under the terms of the origin-
al agreement, or whether Plaintiff for some other reason 
is not entitled to recover for those services. The record 
is devoid of any affidavits, admissions, pleadings or 
other documents which would support summary judg-
ment of dismissal of this claim. (R. 53 & 68; R. 231, Par. 
24 [answers to requests for admissions]; R. 239 last par.) 
See also discussion on page 5 above. 
4. SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS DO NOT BAR 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS. 
An issue of fact remains for determination as to 
whether or not execution of the supplemental agree-
ments (R. 36 & 45) constitutes a bar to Plaintiff s claim 
for extra work and expense in re-designing the Met-
ropolitan Hall of Justice project from a single building 
to the present multiple building arrangement. (R. 47-48; 
60-63; sworn answers to requests for admissions R. 299-
230; sworn answers to interrogatories R. 239). Testi-
mony is required to determine the intent of the parties 
with respect to whether or not early payment of $36,-
000.00 on the fee (to which Plaintiff was already entitled 
under its agreement with Defendants) was intended to 
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constitute a waiver of Plaintiff's claim for extra work 
in re-designing the project after abandonment of work 
that was partially completed at the time that Defen-
dants changed the type of structure which they desired. 
(a) Supplemental agreements contain no waivers 
by Plaintiff. If the supplemental agreements (R. 36 & 
45) do not waive Plaintiff's right to collect for said 
extra work, Plaintiff is entitled to be paid therefor under 
the terms of paragraphs #4 and 7 of the agreement 
quoted on pages 3, 4 and 13 herein (R. 29, Par. #4 and 
R. 30-31, Par. #7). See also Fitzgerald v. Walsh, 107 Wis 
92, 82 NW 717. An analysis of that agreement reveals 
that the Defendants simply waived the requirement of 
prior approval by their Boards of Commissioners of 
work done to that date (because that work was being 
abandoned due to change of type of structure desired 
by Defendants), and therefore Defendants agreed to 
pay $36,000.00 toward the total architectural fee for the 
entire project earlier than it was otherwise due. (R. 29, 
Par. #5). This was reasonable in view of the fact that 
Beecher had worked for almost 10 months and expended 
large sums of money working on the plans that were 
abandoned. The parties agreed that the value to the 
Defendants of the services rendered to that time was 
$36,000.00, (R. 34, Par. 2 and R. 45, Par. 2); that the 
original agreement would remain in full force and effect; 
that the waiver of prior approval of work by respective 
Commissions of Defendants applied only to that single 
payment and that said payment constituted full payment 
for all services to November 10, 1960. There is absolutely 
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nothing in that agreement which precludes Plaintiff from 
asserting a claim for extra drafting and other expenses 
incurred after November 10, 1960, in re-designing the 
project using the new concept developed thereafter. 
Defendants are the ones who changed the type of struc-
ture which they desired and Defendants should be re-
quired under paragraphs # 4 (see pages 3 and 4) and 7 
(see page 13) of the agreement to pay for those changes. 
(R. 29-31). 
Plaintiff was coerced (R. 229) into accepting $36,-
000.00 at that time rather than approximately $120,000.00 
claimed by Plaintiff to have been earned to that date 
when the work being done was abandoned (R, 286). 
(b) Supplemental contracts void for lack of Con-
sideration. Since the failure of the Defendants to ap-
prove the work done by Plaintiff under the direction of 
Defendants' representative was not due to any default 
by Plaintiff, but was solely the result of Defendants 
changing the type of structure which they wanted, the 
unilateral decision of Defendant not to approve that 
work is insufficient consideration to support the supple-
mental agreements; the $36,000.00 had already been 
earned and was payable for abandonment of work done 
by Plaintiff as provided by paragraph # 4 of the agree-
ment (R. 29); accordingly said partial payment of fees 
already earned is not consideration which would support 
the supplemental agreements; therefore said supplement-
al agreements are simply not supported by considera-
tion and are void and unenforceable. Defendants can-
not any more avoid payment for services rendered by 
Plaintiff by refusing to approve work done under the di-
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rection of Defendants' designated representative than an 
owner could avoid payment to a contractor because an 
architect wrongfully failed to approve work that had 
been satisfactorily done. Plaintiff has not been paid a 
single cent for the extra work caused by abandonment 
by Defendants who now seek to construe the supple-
mental agreements as agreements that Plaintiff was in 
essence making a gift to Defendants of 10 months work 
and to thereby prevent Beecher from being paid for re-
doing work done in good faith and abandoned through no 
fault of Beecher. A fair reading of the supplemental 
agreements leads to the conclusion that Defendants sim-
ply didn't want to pay more than the $36,000.00 for the 
abandoned work, which obviously was worth many times 
that amount. Had Defendants intended that no claim be 
made for extra work in bringing the work on the revised 
project to the same point as the work on the prior project 
when the abandonment occurred, they would have said 
so in the supplemental agreements. Those agreements 
were drafted by the Defendants and any ambiguity there-
in should be construed most strongly against the De-
fendants. Skousen v. Smith, 493 P. 2d 1003, 27 U. (2d) 
169; Seat v. Tayco, Inc., 400 P. 2d 503, 16 U (2d) 323; 
Huber & Rowland Const. Co. v. City of South Salt Lake, 
323 P. 2d 238, 7 U. (2d) 273; Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 500 
P. 2d 1007, 28 U. (2d) 231. 
Aided by this presumption and rule of construction, 
the meaning of the supplemental agreements (R. 36 & 
45) is uncertain and require testimony and evidence 
to determine if Plaintiff's claim for extra compensation 
for re-designing and re-drafting of the new project after 
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execution of the supplemental agreements is barred by 
the terms of those agreements and, if so, whether or 
not those agreements are enforceable in view of Plain-
tiff's claim of economic coercion in inducing the ex-
ecution of those agreements and claim by plaintiff that 
the agreements are not supported by consideration. (R. 
229, Par. #11, sworn answers to requests for admissions 
and R. 284-309). 
5. PLAINTIFF IS CONTRACTUALLY ENTITLED TO BE 
PAID FOR ADDITIONAL EXPENSES. 
Plaintiff was unable to perform the work contem-
plated under paragraph #7 of the agreements during 
the construction period with a single inspector because 
of the spread out nature of the re-designed project and 
was required to use additional employees throughout the 
construction period (R. 244, Par. 8 (e ) ) . Plaintiff was 
also required to maintain an office staff to work on De-
fendants' project during the entire 1736 days construction 
period for which Plaintiff has not been reimbursed. Par-
agraph #7 of the agreements between Plaintiff and De-
fendants (R. 30-31) provides in part as follows: 
"The architect shall furnish at his expense a 
qualified on-site inspector . . . during the entire 
time the construction work is in progress, whose 
duties shall consist of checking all shop drawings 
. . . to determine the quality and acceptance of the 
material and/or equipment proposed to be used in 
the facilities being constructed; to supervise and 
inspect all phases of the work being done." 
The costs, to be paid by the Architect for the 
above services to be rendered, shall not exceed 
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$15,000.00. In the event these services exceed this 
amount, it is hereby agreed by all concerned that 
the owner shall assume all costs in excess thereof." 
(emphasis added). 
Defendants paid the additional costs applicable to 
one of the inspectors who supervised construction, but 
have refused to pay the cost of additional employees 
hired by Plaintiff to perform a part of the work specified 
in paragraph #7 (which simply could not be done by a 
single man), and have refused to pay the additional ex-
penses incurred by Plaintiff as a result of the job being 
extended for over 1000 more days than was contemplated 
by the parties at the time that they executed the various 
written agreements (including the supplemental agree-
ments R. 36 & 45). 
Defendants argue that the limit of their liability 
under the agreements paragraph #7 (quoted above) 
is payment for a single inspector. Since the parties did 
not contemplate the additional 1,000 day construction 
period paragraph #7 is ambiguous as to what expenses 
were intended to be paid thereunder. Since Defendants 
drafted the agreements they should be construed most 
strongly against Defendants. (See cases cited on page 
12 above). The dispute as to the expenses to be paid 
by Defendants under the language used in paragraph 
#7 of the agreements, particularly when construed with 
the language of paragraph #4 thereof, (see page 4 
above) requires a trial and production of testimony and 
evidence, and precludes the granting of summary judg-
ment. 
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SUMMARY 
Suit by architect for additional fees and expenses 
claimed to be owed for extra work ordered by Salt Lake 
City and Salt Lake County in connection with design 
and construction of Metropolitan Hall of Justice project. 
Architect worked for approximately 10 months under 
the direction of the representative of Defendants de-
signing a single high-rise building, then Defendants re-
quired that those drawings be abandoned and instructed 
the architect to design the present multiple-building 
facility. Defendants at that time waived the contractural 
requirement of prior approval by City and County 
Commissions of work done and made a partial payment 
to Architect on the total Architectual fee due under the 
original agreement, the parties agreeing that the amount 
paid was in payment for work done to that date. 
Court granted summary judgment at pre-trial dis-
missing Plaintiff's claims for extra fees on theory that 
said partial papment was a waiver by Plaintiff of right 
to collect for extra work done thereafter. Plaintiff claims 
to be entitled to payment for that extra work under 
provisions of Paragraphs # 4 and 7 of the agreement be-
tween the parties. No affidavits were filed by Defen-
dants in support of their motions for summary judgment. 
Contested issues of facts remain unresolved which must 
be tried, which if resolved in favor of Plaintiff would 
entitle Plaintiff to judgment against Defendants, includ-
ing: 
A. Plaintiff's claims for extra compensation for 
space analysis and square foot analysis (R. 53-54, 69, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
par. #7 and 8) (which are not disputed by Defendants 
but which were erroneously dismissed by the court) 
(R. 89-90, par. #7 and 8). 
B. Decision by Defendants to construct project in 
two parts (which resulted in extending construction 
time in excess of 1,000 days more than contemplated 
by parties at time of the agreements between Plaintiff 
and Defendants) was made well after execution of sup-
plemental agreements which Defendants claim is a waiv-
er of Plaintiff's right to be paid for extra expenses and 
services for that extra 1,000 days of construction time. 
If Plaintiffs claim is accurate the supplemental agree-
ments could not be a waiver to a decision not yet made. If 
Defendants deny that said decision was made later, then 
an issue of facts exists which must be resolved by trial, 
thereby precluding summary judgment. This item con-
stitutes the largest of Plaintiff's claims. 
C. The record contains no admissions or affidavits 
which support summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs 
claim for extra compensation for services furnished by 
Plaintiff in connection with Defendants' defense of a 
taxpayer suit involving the award of the jail equipment 
contract. An issue of fact remains for trial as to whether 
or not Plaintiff is entitled to be paid for those services. 
D. The supplemental agreements are ambiguous as 
to whether or not their terms preclude Plaintiff from 
asserting a claim for re-drafting of abandoned drawings 
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using the new project concept, which ambiguity should 
be most strongly construed against Defendants since 
they drafted the instruments. Those agreements simply 
waive conditions precedent to payment of a part of the 
architects fee and fix the value of the services rendered 
to that date. Nothing in those agreements preclude 
Plaintiff from asserting the claims asserted in this law-
suit. A trial is necessary to resolve that ambiguity. 
E. The consideration recited in the supplemental 
agreements is that of waiver of approval of work by City 
and County Commissions, which approval obviously 
would not be given since the drawings had been aban-
doned as the result of Defendants changing type of fa-
cility which they desired. The agreements recite that 
the work done was worth the amount paid and Plaintiff 
is entitled to payment therefore under paragraph # 4 
which requires Defendants to pay for designs and speci-
fications which are abandoned. (R. 29, Par. # 4 ) . Ac-
cordingly a dispute of fact exists as to whether or not 
there is consideration to support said agreements or 
whether they are void for lack of consideration (R. 229, 
Par. #11) . This dispute precludes the granting of sum-
mary judgment and makes a trial necessary. 
F. A dispute which requires a trial exists with re-
spect to the right of Plaintiff to recover under paragraph 
# 7 of the agreements (R. 30-31, Par. #7) for expenses 
and services furnished during the construction period. 
Defendants claim that Plaintiff can collect for only a 
single employee. Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to be 
paid for all expenses incurred by it in performing the 
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services required under paragraph #7 (found on page 13 
above), the performance of which required the services 
of more than the single employee, because of the spread-
out revised project. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred in 
granting summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's com-
plaint and that the judgment of the lower court should 
be vacated and the case remanded for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Appellants 
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